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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article XII, § 19 (1993 as amended). 
Blacklisting Forbidden. Each person in Utah is free to 
obtain and enjoy employment whenever possible, and a person 
or corporation, or their agent, servant, or employee may not 
maliciously interfere with any person from obtaining 
employment or enjoying employment already obtained from any 
other person or corporation. 
Public Policy. It is hereby declared to be the public 
policy of the State of Utah that the right of persons 
to work, whether in private employment or for the state 
. . . sshall not be denied or abridged on account of 
membership or nonmembership in a labor union, labor 
organization or any other type of association; and 
further, that the right to live includes the right to 
work. The exercise of the right to work must be 
protected and maintained free from undue restraints and 
coercion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-4: 
Agreement, understanding or practice denying right to work 
declared, illegal. Any express or implied agreement, 
understanding or practice between employer and any labor 
union, labor organization or any other type of association, 
whereby any person not a member of such union, organization 
or any other type of association shall be denied the right 
to work for an employer, or whereby membership in such labor 
union, labor organization or any other type of association 
shall be denied the right to work for an employer, or 
whereby membership in such labor union, labor organization 
or any other type of association is made a condition of 
employment or continuation of employment by such employer, 
or whereby any such union, organization or any other type of 
association acquires an employment monopoly in any 
enterprise or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal 
combination or conspiracy and against public policy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-5: 
Any agreement/ understanding or practice designed to violate 
chapter declared illegal. Any express or implied agreement, 
understanding or practice which is designed to cause or 
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require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any 
employer or labor union, labor organization or any other 
type of association, whether or not a party thereto, to 
violate any provision of this chapter is hereby declared an 
illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and contrary 
to public policy. 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that 
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join 
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading 
is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after 
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets 
forth a claim for relief to v.<hich the adverse party is not 
required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at 
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) 
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of 
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DEFENDANTS7 MOTION TO DISMISS WAS AND SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED AS A MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT AS A MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A footnote on page 6 of the State Defendants' Brief contains 
a cursory statement that the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
was really a Motion for Summary Judgment. However, they are 
mistaken for the following reasons: 
A. The Parties Did Not Treat the Motion as a Summary Judgment 
Motion. 
The State Defendants' motion was entitled "The State's 
Motion to Dismiss Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint," 
not "Motion for Summary Judgment," and it was filed pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
No affidavits of any kind were submitted by the parties to 
provide additional evidence, nor did the trial court invite any. 
The oral argument transcript on the motion certainly reflects 
that the parties viewed the motion only as a motion to dismiss. 
Counsel for Rock Product's emphasized the difference between 
State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and a motion for summary 
judgment when he stated: 
We are entitled to proceed with our cause of 
action, to have reasonable opportunities of 
discovery, to find out more about the details 
in this case so that we can flush out our 
4 
various causes of action and then if some of 
them are not totally, legally sufficient, 
then to go through the motion for summary 
judgment once we have got to a stage that's 
appropriate in the handling of the lawsuit. 
(R. 2557.) 
The definite implication of this statement is that Rock 
Products believed the motion to be what it was presented by the 
State Defendants to be: a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6). The following oral argument statement by State 
Defendants' counsel indicates they too viewed and treated the 
motion only as a motion for summary judgment: 
[Rock Products has] made a big deal here in 
argument as well as in their brief about Rule 
8 of [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]. 
Well, I'd like to — we mentioned this in our 
brief and I think it bears repeating again. 
What Ru"1 d 3(a) says, Rule 8 requires that the 
— requires "that the pleading shall contain 
a short and plain statement of the claims 
showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.11 I mean, he can allege anything but 
if it doesn't state a cause of action you 
cannot stay in court on it. That's why we 
have motions to dismiss. That's why there 
are rules on that. And you know, I might be 
able to quarrel with the clarity of their 
pleadings but I don't need to. Regardless of 
how clear their pleadings are they have not 
stated a cause of action on any of these 
counts. 
(R. 2567) (emphasis added). 
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B. The Trial Court Treated the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss. 
A trial court has not treated a motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment where no factual findings are made or 
relied upon. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1990). Like the trial court in Colman, the trial court in 
the present action only entered conclusions of law in granting 
State Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
At no time did the did the trial court state that it 
was treating the motion as one for summary judgment. The trial 
court's order refers to the hearing on the "Motion to Dismiss,ff 
the order grants the State Defendants' "Motion to Dismiss," and 
the order contains no findings of fact to suggest it was a 
summary judgment ruling. (R. 773-776.) In addition, the order 
reflects that the trial court "finds and holds that as a matter 
of law Rock Products' Amended Third-Part Complaint fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted against the State 
Defendants." (R. 774.) The trial court's order states that its 
finding was made after considering only "the pleadings, the 
memoranda and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel." 
(R. 774.) 
Despite this, the State Defendants argue in this appeal 
that the court somehow silently converted the motion to one for 
summary judgment by considering "materials outside of the 
6 
pleadings." (Brief of State Defendants, p. 6, n. 1.) The State 
Defendants do not state what those materials might be or to what 
extent and for what purpose they were supposedly considered by 
the trial court. 
In addition to the complaint and answer, the only 
documents filed with the trial court concerning the motion were 
supporting memoranda with one appendix to a memorandum, a 
contract. Attaching a contract as an appendix to a memorandum 
and incorporating it by reference does not raise the State 
Defendants' memorandum and attachment above the level of 
argument. Furthermore, there is no indication that the trial 
court considered any "materials outside of the pleadings." Even 
if the appendixed contract was viewed by the trial court as a 
submission of material outside the pleadings, there is no basis 
to assert that the trial court's ruling was based on anything 
other than the pleadings. Homart Development Co. v. W.T. Sigman, 
868 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1989). 
As a general matter, a trial court's review of argument 
contained in motions and memoranda does not warrant conversion of 
a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See, Miller v. 
Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991) (construing Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The trial 
court in this case did not treat the motion to dismiss as a 
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motion for summary judgment as State Defendants' suggest. 
C. A Trial Court Cannot, on its Own, Convert a Motion to 
Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
M[A] trial court cannot on its own motion convert a 
rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1990), citing Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 477 P.2d 150, 
151 (Utah 1970). In Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 477 P.2d 150 
(Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court 
cannot convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment on its own initiative: 
[the trial court] has no more right to ask 
the plaintiff how he will establish his claim 
than [the court] has to require the defendant 
to state what its defense will be. It would 
hcive been highly improper for the court, on 
the motion to dismiss, to have given the 
defendant thirty days to present proof as to 
the truth of the alleged statement or as to 
the lack of malice. 
Id. at 151. Since the parties did not treat the motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, this Court should find 
that the trial court could not have done so on its own accord. 
D. The State Defendants Cannot Convert Their Motion to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Appeal. 
The position taken by the State Defendants that the motion 
was one for summary judgment is raised by them for the first time 
on appeal. However, it is too late for them to do so. The Utah 
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Supreme Court in Colman, supra, stated that, if a trial court 
cannot convert a motion to dismiss to a summary judgment on its 
own, a party cannot do so on appeal. 795 P.2d at 62 5. 
E. Even if the Trial Court Did Convert the Motion to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Such Conversion Pertains to Only One 
Cause of Action and is Reversible Error. 
The State Defendants do not specify what materials 
outside of the pleadings were included in their motion. As noted 
above, the State Defendants presumably refer to the appendix to 
their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, which is 
the contract between the Board of Water Resources and the 
Richards Irrigation Company. Certainly that document has no 
bearing on any cause of action other than Rock Products' cause of 
action for breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. 
Therefore, the motion could not be treated as a motion to dismiss 
on non-contract claims. 
Even though the contract was argued by both parties in 
the motion, the contract attached as the appendix did not 
contradict the allegations of Rock Products' claim, and it 
therefore did not provide any basis to convert the motion to 
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Watters v. Pelican 
Int'l., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1452, 1457, n.l (D. Colo. 1989). 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss could not be properly treated 
as one for summary judgment as to any cause of action. 
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Even if the trial court, without informing the parties, 
treated the motion as one for summary judgment, it committed 
reversible error in doing so. Trial courts are urged to use 
caution before converting a motion to dismiss to a summary 
judgment motion. The Utah Supreme Court has stated "it is 
generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one 
for summary judgment." Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 57 0 
P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1977). There was no justification in this 
case to convert the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment 
motion. 
In addition, a proper conversion requires more than 
what occurred in this case. In Jackson v. Integra Inc., 952 F.2d 
1260 (10th Cir. 1991) the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that, where the trial court relied upon an exhibit provided by a 
defendant, the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a 
motion for summary judgment and it was reversible error (1) to 
not inform the plaintiff that the motion would be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment and (2) to not give the plaintiff the 
opportunity to gather evidence to demonstrate the existence of a 
material fact. Id. at 1261. See, also, Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 
1562, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991). If, as the State Defendants 
suggest, the trial court did treat all or a portion of the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment, its order must be reversed 
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because it did not properly convert the motion to a motion for 
summary judgment by informing the parties of its intended 
treatment and affording Rock Products the requisite notice and 
opportunity to present evidence of material facts. 
At oral argument on the State Defendants' motion to 
dismiss, counsel for Rock Products argued the impropriety of the 
State Defendants' factual argument when at issue was only the 
sufficiency of the pleadings. (R. 2555-2557; 2564-2565.) Rock 
Products reiterated that no discovery had taken place and no 
affidavits had been submitted in support of the State Defendants' 
motion. (R. 2555.) Rock Products also argued that in order to 
accept the arguments of the State Defendants, the trial court had 
to assume facts that were not supported by evidence. (R. 2556.) 
The trial court's failure to give Rock Products any reasonable 
opportunity to present material to address the intent of the 
contracting parties to benefit Rock Products was improper. 
F. The Trial Court Erred by Ruling on the Intent of the 
Contracting Parties. 
In order for the trial court to determine the intent of 
the contracting parties (R. 774), it must consider the terms of 
the contract as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances. 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989). The trial court's determination of intent went 
well beyond the scope of a Rule 12(b) 6 motion addressing the 
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sufficiency of pleadings. More importantly, the trial court had 
absolutely no evidence before it regarding the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. A contract appended to a memorandum provides 
no information whatsoever regarding the facts and circumstances 
surrounding it. 
Even if the trial court did treat the memoranda as 
"evidence,11 the memoranda of the parties raise ci material dispute 
of fact regarding the intent of the parties. The oral argument 
of Rock Products' counsel illustrates this point as well as the 
point raised in the preceding paragraph: 
We have alleged, in any event, that Rock 
Products is a third-party beneficiary. Now 
the strange think about this whole analysis 
is I think the state and us agree. The test 
in that circumstance as to whether or not 
there's a third-party beneficiary is whether 
or not the contract between the two main 
pcirties, that is the state and Richards in 
this case, was intended to benefit Rock. 
Well, we've alleged that there was clearly 
intent to harm. The question is whether 
there was intent to benefit. Your honor, I 
don't know how in the world you can make that 
determination until we have had a least some 
opportunity to engage in some discovery. 
They say there's no intent; we say there is 
intent. They haven't even got a defense 
anywhere that contests it. They say the 
intent governs; we say intent is to benefit 
Rock Products. That's it. Now we're 
entitled to get involved in our discovery to 
verify that. So it seems to me we are in 
basic agreement on that whole [point] except 
they are engaging in some factual semantics 
12 
that there wasn't any intent and they have 
nothing to back it up. 
(R. 2564-65.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, even applying the 
standards of a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings raised 
material issues of fact, and the trial court erred when it did 
not consider all facts and all inferences fairly arising from 
those facts in a light most favorable to Rock Products. Young v. 
Texas Co., 331 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1958). 
If treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial court's 
ruling was also improper. As set forth in Appellant's Brief, 
allegations in the complaint must be considered as true and in 
the light most favorable to Rock Products. As noted in Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), a dismissal is a 
severe measure and can be granted by the trial court only if it 
is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state 
of facts which could be presented in support of the claim." See 
also Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,, Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah 
App. 1992). lf[I]f there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue 
should be resolved in favor of giving the party a opportunity to 
present its proof." Colman at 624, citing Baur v. Pacific Fin. 
Corp., 383 P.2d 397, 397 (Utah 1963). 
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POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 GOVERNS RETROACTIVITY OF 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS. 
The State Defendants argue that a 1987 amendment to the 
Governmental Immunity Act must be applied retroactively based 
solely on the reasoning of Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1980). However, State Defendants fail to address Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court refused to retroactively 
apply an amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act which 
provided that the management of flood waters is considered to be 
a governmental function. The Court noted that Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-3 mandates that "no part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so decldr-jn." Id. at 461. It 
concluded that the amendment did not fall within the exception to 
this rule which permits the retroactive application of statutory 
amendments ,nwhen the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the 
meaning of an earlier enactment' or [the amendment] is merely an 
xamplification as to how the law should have been understood 
prior to its enactment' . . . ." Id. at 461-462 (citations 
omitted). 
The 1987 amendment at issue expanded the definition of 
"governmental function" by defining everything a governmental 
entity does as a "governmental function." Provo City Corp. v. 
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State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1990) (the 1987 amendment 
expanded the definition of "governmental function11 by defining 
everything a governmental entity does as a 'governmental 
function.') The amendment is a substantive change from the laws 
that existed when Rock Products' causes of action arose. Because 
it would provide the State Defendants with a greater degree of 
immunity, it must not be applied retroactively. Rocky Mountain 
Thrift at 462. If an amendment stating that flood control 
activities fall within the meaning of governmental function was 
not to be applied retroactively to protect prior governmental 
action, a sweeping amendment defining governmental function and 
overturning a long history of judicial construction should not be 
applied retroactively to protect a variety of prior governmental 
actions. -1 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE STATE DEFENDANTS' ACTS CONSTITUTE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT. 
The application of the pre-1987 Governmental Immunity 
Act Provision to determine whether the acts Rock Products 
complained of were discretionary will require the benefit of a 
The reason the Utah Supreme Court retroactively applied a Governmental Immunity Act amendment in 
Frank, 613 P.2d at 519, may be that the Court viewed the amendment as one of the exceptions to the rule 
prohibiting retroactive application of statutes. In the event this Court deems the Rocky Mountain TJirift Stores and 
Frank cases to be in conflict, the most recent case should control. 
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factual record. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 
(Utah 1990). As is illustrated by the State Defendants' factual 
arguments in their appeal brief, pp. 16-21, the application of 
the pre-1987 discretionary function standard to Rock Products7 
numerous causes of action raise issues of fact. 
The Standiford/Johnson discretionary function test 
"does not refer to xwhat government may do, but what government 
alone must do' and includes ^activities not unique in themselves 
. . . but essential to the performance of those activities that 
are uniquely governmental.'11 Bennett v. Bow VaJley Dev. Corp., 
797 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1990), citing Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989) 
(citation omitted; emphasis in original). To apply the 
discretionary function test to the State Defendants' conduct, 
significant discovery must take place before it can be determined 
if State Defendants' conduct falls within a "must do" category. 
Thus, because it is premature to make such a determination, the 
trial court improperly dismissed Rock Products' claims against 
the State Defendants for failure to state sufficient claims. 
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POINT IV 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE PROTECTING 
FREEDOM TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT IN ARTICLE XII, 
§ 19 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS SELF-EXECUTING. 
In part, Article XII, § 19 of the Utah Constitution 
states, "every person in this state shall be free to obtain 
employment whenever possible . . . ." Rock Products asserts that 
this clause of the provision is self-executing. Self-executing 
constitutional clauses may be divisible from clauses which are 
not self-executing. In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 
P.2d 157 (Utah 1960), Justice Wade, in dissent2 notes the 
following quote from the Supreme Court of South Carolina: 
It is within the power of those who adopt a 
constitution to make some of its provisions 
self-executing, with the object of putting it 
beyond the power ut the Legislature to render 
such provision nugatory by refusing to pass 
laws to carry them into effect; and where the 
matter with which a given Section of the 
Constitution is divisible/ one clause thereof 
may be self-executing and another clause or 
clauses may not be self-executing. 
Constitutional provisions are self-executing 
when there is a manifest intention that they 
should go into immediate effect and no 
ancillary legislation is necessary to the 
enjoyment of a right given and the 
enforcement of a duty imposed. 
2 
This dissenting opinion is cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Colman v Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 632 (Utah 1990), in support ot its reversal ot the maiority opinion in Sp}im>\ille Banking
 % 349 
P.2d at 159, and other Utah Supreme Court opinions, in reaching the conclusion that Article 1, Section 22 ot the 
Utah Constitution is self-executing. 
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Id. at 161, citing Schick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway 
Dep't, 157 S.E. 842, 847-48 (S.E. 1931) (emphasis added). Rock 
Products asserts that the first phrase of § 19 is divisible from 
the rest of the provision because it states a clear, 
constitutionally protected right to be free to obtain employment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to work 
embodied in § 19 is "one of the basic freedoms vouched safe by 
our state constitution . . . [which] complements makes more 
meaningful the other rights guaranteed as part of our 
constitutional liberties." State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 
(Utah 1952) . The constitutional right to be free to obtain 
employment is "mandatory and obligatory as it is" and needs no 
legislation to be enforced. See Colman, supra at 63 5. 
Therefore, article XII, § 19 of the Utah Constitution affords a 
constitutionally protected right upon which Rock Products bases, 
and has sufficiently pleaded, a valid cause of action. 
Although the legislature has provided criminal 
enforcement for violations of § 19 (Utah Code Ann. § 34-24-1 et 
seq.), nowhe^re has the legislature limited enforcement of § 19 to 
criminal enforcement. As Rock Products has argued in its appeal 
brief, criminal enforcement statutes do not limit or bar any 
right which may be pursued in a civil action (R. 1006-07.) 
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State Defendants' reference to the recent revision to 
§ 19 does not alter the foregoing conclusion. An amendment 
eliminating the requirement that an action be raised to the level 
of a crime while leaving the remainder of the constitutional 
provision intact does nothing to eliminate civil remedies 
available for violation of that constitutional provision. 
POINT V 
ROCK PRODUCTS HAS STATED A VALID CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A. State Defendants Misstate the Standard Rock Products must 
Meet to Establish a S 1983 Claim. 
State Defendants mischaracterize the standard Rock 
Products must meet to sufficiently state a civil rights claim 
under Rule 12. State Defendants argue that for Rock Products to 
state a claim, it !*mast be able to show as a matter oi: lav* thai, 
the State ^deliberately deprived [Karen] of his constitutional 
rights./f|3 All that is required for Rock Products to state a 
cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is to allege that the 
State Defendants, acting under the color of state law, deprived 
Rock Products of rights secured by the United States 
3The case cited by the State defendants in support ot this assertion is a curious choice. Wade v. Ha\nes 
concerns a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by a corrections otticer who 
attacked a prison inmate. The standard cited is a standard ot proof at trial. Even the cases cited with approval by 
the court in Wade do not address motions to dismiss, but analyze motions tor summary judgment, supported by 
affidavits and other evidence. Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D. 111. 1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 
193, 197 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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Constitution. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 
1986). Rock Products has sufficiently pleaded a civil rights 
cause of action in its Fifteenth Cause of Action. (R. 522-524.) 
B. Rock Products Has Been Deprived of Property Interests by the 
State's Action Without Due Process of Law as Prohibited by 
S 1983 of the United States Code. 
Rock Products Was Deprived of Property Interests. 
In general, Rock Products has alleged that it has been 
deprived of property interests without due process of law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. (R. 522.) Rock Products property interests are 
derived from rights secured by state law. The Utah Supreme Court 
has noted that the United States Supreme Court recognizes valid 
property interests which are derived from a variety of sources: 
11
 * [P]roperty, ' interests subject to procedural due process 
protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. 
Rather, ^property' denotes a broad range of interests that are 
secured by ^existing rules or understandings.'" Celebrity Club 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Utah 
1982), citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 92 S.Ct. 
2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). 
Contrary to the State Defendants7 argument, Rock 
Products' civil rights claim is based on much more than concepts 
of breach of contract. As noted above, Rock Products ability to 
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freely obtain gainful employment, and to be free from 
blacklisting, is secured by Article XII, § 19 of the Utah 
Constitution and rises above the concept of mere contract rights. 
See, Local 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834 F.2d 884, 889 (10th 
Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) ("The Utah 
blacklisting laws arguably confer 'nonnegotiable state-law rights 
on . . . employees independent of any right established by 
contract."). 
The underlying policy consideration of the "Utah Right 
to Work Law" is also applicable to this case. That law states 
the public policy of Utah to be that "The exercise of the right 
to work must be protected and maintained free from undue 
restraints and coercion." Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-2. 
By virtue of the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
its statutory laws, Rock Product's right to seek gainful 
employment free from coercion by blacklisting rises to the level 
of a property right within the broad range of interests 
constituting property. 
As alleged in the Complaint, Rock Products had also 
been requested by Hadfield Irrigation Company to perform 
approximately $52,000 worth of work for Hadfield on a state 
project to be undertaken by Hadfield. (R. 503.) When the State 
Defendants prohibited Rock Products from performing this work, it 
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deprived Rock Products of $52,000. Under any definition, money 
constitutes property. 
The further conspiracy on the part of the State 
Defendants to defraud Rock Products of $34,000 worth of sand also 
constituted a taking or appropriation of a property interest. 
(R. 512-13.) 
C. The Action of the State Defendants Constituted a Deprivation 
of Property Interests Without Due Process m Violation of 
S 1983. 
It is self evident that State employees acting under 
color of state law to deprive Rock Products of property through 
outright fraud does not meet any standard of "due process.11 
Further, State employees acting under color of state law to 
deprive Rock Products of its right to gainful employment and of 
the benefit of its contractual dealings with Hadfield by 
blacklisting--a process in violation of the constitution and 
criminal statutes of the State of Utah—not meet any standard of 
"due process.11 Rock Products' claims with respect to interference 
with the Hadfield contract are analogous to the failure-to-hire 
context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e-3(a). In those cases, generally, an employee is 
protected from discrimination simply for participating in legal 
proceedings. See Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State Univ., 
797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, Rock Products 
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asserts it has the right to be protected from retaliation, in the 
form of blacklisting, simply for exercising its legal right to 
enforce and/or to litigate disputes arising under The Richard 
Irrigation Co. (R. 503.) 
Consequently, the State Defendants, acting under color 
of state law, deprived Rock Products of rights and privileges 
secured by the United States Constitution and violated § 1983 of 
the United States Code. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the foregoing arguments, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's Order and Judgment in its 
entirety and deny the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of May, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
'DAVID L. BARCLAY 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
Attorneys for RoclylProducts 
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